1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
3	THOMAS TURNER, an individual,) on behalf of himself and others)
4	similarly situated,) Civil Action
5	Plaintiffs) No. 20-11530-FDS
6	vs.)
7	LIBERTY MUTUAL RETIREMENT) BENEFIT PLAN; LIBERTY MUTUAL) MEDICAL PLAN; LIBERTY MUTUAL) RETIREMENT BENEFIT PLAN)
9	RETIREMENT BOARD; LIBERTY) MUTUAL GROUP INC., a)
10	Massachusetts) Company; LIBERTY MUTUAL)
11	INSURANCE COMPANY, a) Massachusetts)
12	Company; and, DOES 1-50,) Inclusive,)
13	Defendants)
14 15	BEFORE: MAGISTRATE JUDGE DONALD L. CABELL
16	MOTION HEARING
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19	John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse
20	1 Courthouse Way Boston, MA 02210
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22	October 4, 2024 2:00 p.m.
23	Valerie A. O'Hara, FCRR, RPR
24	Official Court Reporter John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse
25	1 Courthouse Way Boston, MA 02210 E-mail: vaohara@gmail.com

1	APPEARANCES:
2	For The Plaintiffs:
3 4 5	Winters & Associates, SARAH BALL, ATTORNEY, 8489 La Mesa Boulevard, La Mesa, California 91942; For the Defendants:
6	McDermott Will & Emery, by ANDREW C. LIAZOS, ESQ., and MARA THEOPHILA, ATTORNEY, 200 Clarendon Street, Suite 5800, Boston, Massachusetts 02116;
8	McDermott Will & Emery LLP, by RICHARD DIGGS, ESQ. 340 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10173.
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1	<u>PROCEEDINGS</u>
2	THE CLERK: This is the case of Turner vs. Liberty
3	Mutual Retirement Benefit Plan, et al., Civil Action
4	Number 20-11530 will now be heard before this court.
5	Will counsel please identify themselves for the
6	record.
7	MS. BALL: Yes, Sarah Ball for the plaintiff,
8	Mr. Turner.
9	THE COURT: Good morning. You are mooted,
10	Mr. Liazos.
11	MR. LIAZOS: Thank you, Andrew Liazos for Liberty
12	Mutual. Good morning.
13	THE COURT: Good morning.
14	MR. DIGGS: Richard Diggs for Liberty Mutual.
15	MS. THEOPHILA: Mara Theophila for Liberty Mutual
16	as well.
17	THE COURT: Good morning to you as well.
18	Let me begin with an apology. We had the prior
19	session that ran over, and so I thank you guys for being on
20	time, and I'm sorry I wasn't here for the start time, but
21	I'm hopeful that within an hour, we can deal with the
22	issues before the Court.
23	And I want to begin, I guess, Ms. Ball, by just
24	asking you a question. Well, let me ask a question of
25	everyone generally. Oftentimes it is the case from the

time parties have filed something with the Court to the time we actually have an opportunity to meet and discuss, life has continued to go on, the parties have talked some, and the scope of what is before the Court may have changed some.

So let me begin by asking, has anything changed with respect to the pending motion and what we should be spending our time talking about?

MS. BALL: As far as plaintiff is concerned, there has been no significant change, no.

THE COURT: All right. So, with that, Ms. Ball, let me start with you because it seems a fair portion of this and what we talk about may turn on the scope of the claim that is left, and I may refer to that as the (a)(3) claim, I may refer to as the breach claim, but we all know what we are talking about.

And one of the things I did was to go back and look at the complaint and just to see how it was articulated there because there is this suggestion throughout the papers that what you are articulating to be the breach of a fiduciary duty has at times been amorphous or has shifted, has changed from something that, according to Liberty Mutual, was more of a -- more based sort of on a combination of things, things that people were told versus things that happened, extrajudicial-type statements versus

one more based on looking at plan language and seeing what it represented and then contending that the defendants acted inappositely, so I've got the complaint in front of me.

I see paragraph 69, a sentence that appears to be that, "At the time," that reads, "At the time that defendants provided information to plaintiff and the class regarding credit for time employed with Safeco, defendants did not intend to give such credit," and it says, "They never informed them of their intent not to credit plaintiff for the time employed at Safeco until plaintiff sought benefits."

And then it goes on to add a few more details, but would you agree or disagree that that encompasses your breach of fiduciary duty claim in this case such that the discovery we talk about then might be warranted should turn on whether it bears in any way on those allegations?

MS. BALL: So I think it's a combination of things, and let me know if this does not answer your question, and I apologize if that's the case. It's a combination of things that Mr. Turner was told that employees of Safeco were told in writing, orally. It's a combination of promises that were given and were expressed in the merger documents, but it is also the previous SPDs, the previous plans and the things that those plans

promised, so it's not just one of those things, it's a combination of those things that combined to give

Mr. Turner and these employees an understanding of what they would receive when they retired that then ended up being not what they received.

THE COURT: But to hear you say that, it's almost like you're saying there may have been several pitches, comments that were made in SPDs along the way, but you do not have this framed as several claims, all of which or each one of which amounts to a breach of a duty or a breach of an agreement, and, in fact, the way it's worded, it almost could be seen as speaking to a singular event where you say at the time that defendants provided information regarding credit for time employed with Safeco, they did not intend to give such credit.

And it's not up to me in this setting to adjudicate the scope of this claim. I mean, that's going to be for Judge Saylor if the case ever gets that far, but I do have to figure out what's fair for discovery purposes, especially where this is the only claim left, so for both sides, I want to be fair, but I don't know that I can endorse a theory that says it's many representations made over the course of many years, and, as such, agree that you therefore should be allowed to discover all sorts of stuff, at least without not having a more certain sense of what

duty was breached here.

MS. BALL: Well, with all due respect, your Honor, that's the problem in this case is one we've been stifled on discovery this whole time, but discovery we have done has shown us that there was a longer history of these misrepresentations than maybe we even thought in the first place, and, you know, part of the reason why we've had to shift to this (a)(3) claim now is because our (a)(1)(B) claim was denied.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. BALL: Even though, we, plaintiffs, believe that we have been able to bring that claim and that the terms of this last SPD did allow -- did allow Mr. Turner what he believed he had a right to. We're left here now saying, okay, we think looking at all of those documents over time combined with the information Mr. Turner had received over all of this time that the equitable solution is to amend this plan to line up with this decade plus of information that Mr. Turner had received.

Now, is that a long time? Is that a big period of time to conduct discovery? Sure, but that's because it was a long period of time that these employees were receiving information that led them to stay in part potentially with Liberty Mutual because they believed that in doing so, that staying this period of time that they would be receiving a

certain benefit.

because some of this may be semantics, some of this we still contend there was an event that constitutes the breach, but in order to prove it, we need to be able to discover changes in things that were said prior to that to put that all in context, so it may not matter all that much, but if Judge Saylor were here and you guys were on the eve of trial and Judge Saylor said, look, I need to instruct the jury what the claim is or I need to instruct the jury that on timing when the plaintiff says at the time that defendants provided information to the plaintiff they didn't intend to give the credit that they were talking about, what year would you be invoking as representative of that conduct?

MS. BALL: I don't know that I have a great answer for you right now because we haven't received all of this discovery to see what was said and at what time, but it was from the beginning, from the merger, there were discussions that were given, there were plans that were communicated that ended up not being consistent with what they actually ever did.

I feel I'm not being very helpful to you and maybe I'm not.

THE COURT: Well, no, I understand what you are

saying.

MS. BALL: Yes.

THE COURT: But this is almost like a -- be a great sort of law school exam for some sort of class because what Judge Saylor has done has been to narrow the scope of what the case is about, and because of that, I think I have to be mindful, just like you guys have to be mindful of ensuring that we're not ignoring that there may be some things that have happened along the way that the plaintiff is unhappy with that no longer matter for purposes of what's before the Court.

So, essentially, broadly speaking, the ERISA, core ERISA claims are no longer in play, and it's more of a -- within that setting, was there unethical conduct? Did they misrepresent something where they had a duty to be honest with me, did they say something dishonest?

That's in essence what we are left with, and I think it's my job for discovery purposes to try to put some parameters on that so we're not talking about an open-ended thing where we are, where conceivably we could be talking about any representative that was made in writing or orally at any time, but at the same time, I'm saying I don't know if I have to decide all of that because, as I said, a few minutes ago, it could still be the case that for discovery purposes, you should be entitled to collect information

over a multi-year period that could bear on whether at a specific moment or a couple of key moments Liberty Mutual breached a duty that it owed to Turner.

So that's what I'm saying, it may not matter in the end, but I think at the same time in fairness to me and in fairness to Liberty Mutual, especially where they raised this and they say you're trying to kind of change this, that's why I wanted to start out, and I'm not going to dwell on this for this whole time, but I want to start out by trying to get you to give me a sense from your perspective of what the essence of this claim is.

At some point you would have to say the criminal conduct or the unlawful conduct ended, it ended when something happened, and I guess I was trying to get you to focus, okay, tell me, when did it start and when did it end?

On the when did it start part, I hear you to be saying hard to say, they've said a number of things along the way, so on that part, it's a little amorphous, but when from my edification would you say for purposes of this claim it was fully realized, that is, that the breach was recognized when they now acted this way, which is to say differently than what they had indicated to me before.

MS. BALL: Sure. If we're putting it that way, I would say it ended when Mr. Turner made his claims for

benefits and was denied the cost sharing that he had been told he would receive for a decade.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MS. BALL: I know that's a long time, I know that's a long period of time, but that's the point, that's the wrong here is that they induced these employees to stay for a decade because that's what they believed they needed to do in order to be eligible for this cost sharing. When that decade was up, they didn't receive what they had been told they'd receive that whole time, so I understand it's a long period of time, and our instinct is to want to narrow, but that's the point, that's the point of this.

THE COURT: All right. Let's start with that then. Why then, help me sort of fill it in, why do you need years's worth of data when you, from where you sit, can say, well, here's what Mr. Turner says they told him, here are the representations they made to him as relations to the cost-sharing contributions and we now know as of X date he no longer was going to get the benefit of those contributions, and I imagine we have that in writing, the announcement, this benefit is no longer available to you, so why do you need more and what more do you need?

MS. BALL: Well, we need more for a couple of reasons because Liberty Mutual is saying we didn't tell Mr. Turner that. That's not consistent. We also need more

because this is still, I mean, class cert was denied, but it was denied without prejudice.

This is still a punitive class action, so to have that information that can go back to say the merger agreement, which shows that it was an understanding of the merger of these companies that they would receive this benefit to show that this is treatment that they, too, not Mr. Turner, that it was a whole punitive class of people.

THE COURT: Let me stop you there because I want to make this constructive even as we go along. If we say, all right, we go back to the merger and you get documents relating to that, what sorts of documents because we could imagine there's hundreds of thousands of pages relating to a merger, a whole bunch, which would have absolutely nothing to do with this case. So when you say documents to the merger, what exactly would you be referring to?

MS. BALL: Yes, I can point you directly to request for production we gave, it's Number 69, and it's, as written, "All documents relating to the merger between Liberty Mutual and Safeco, which describe or relate to the treatment of years of service for purposes of determining eligibility participation vesting, any form of benefit, accrual or general benefits under any ERISA benefit plan, including the retirement plan or health plan." That is targeted.

THE COURT: That is targeted. No, no, I should have said this at the beginning, one of the things I like to do in these, when you say something like that where I think it might make sense to have you stop for a minute and let me hear from Liberty Mutual, I'll ask them to comment, and I'll come back to you. I read that statement, I listened to it. That sounds reasonable to me on its face.

So, Liberty Mutual, let me ask you with respect to RFP 69 where it does appear to be limited to documents that would bear on what people might have been told about this aspect of their benefits, do you object to that on principal or would you say it's already been complied with or we've given documents constructively to provide the same information or what?

MR. LIAZOS: A few things, your Honor. First, what has not been mentioned is that Liberty Mutual has produced a pamphlet that was given generally to all Safeco employees, which specifically addressed the cost sharing issue and specifically said there would not be credit for purposes of the Liberty Mutual plan and that Safeco service, and that was recognized in Judge Saylor's summary judgment motion to which we have asked for discovery from Mr. Turner. He just says he didn't get it but everybody else did, so we provided documents relative to that issue.

THE COURT: This is at the time of the merger?

MR. LIAZOS: This is immediately after the signing of the merger.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LIAZOS: Again, it's referenced in Judge Saylor's earlier summary judgment opinion. So they're looking for a document that doesn't exist, and they pointed to nothing in terms of misrepresentations other than world misrepresentations.

THE COURT: Well, before you get into that, I'm not asking you to get into your whole argument now.

MR. LIAZOS: Understood.

argument, which is it doesn't strike me unreasonable that somebody in a case like this would say, hey, I'd like documents that are around the time of the merger that may have spoken to how this issue is going to be addressed, and my question to you is if those exist, would there be a problem with turning them over or would you say whatever exists has been turned over or what?

MR. LIAZOS: I would say, your Honor, that Liberty Mutual has turned over documents relative to that matter, but at this point it's not longer relevant. Judge Saylor has ruled on the plan document and the SPDs. That count is no longer live in this case, the only claim --

THE COURT: Well, the (a)(3) claim basically says

you told me one thing and you did something else, so why wouldn't it matter what they may have been told at the time of the merger if the claim is that years later you acted in a different manner?

MR. LIAZOS: So if -- well, first of all, the discovery request does not say that. It doesn't comply with the local rule, it is a broad-base ask, and indeed, your Honor, the ask for additional discovery was only made after March 15th, which was the last day of the scheduling order in which time they've come up with a new theory for the case, so discovery has been granted on these items.

We did ask before April 5th for specific items and they said, well, we do have these specific items, but then we've got a motion to compel that is just incredibly broad, so it's hard for us to answer that with more specificity other than to note to the Court and what was noted by Judge Saylor that a pamphlet was given to all Safeco employees generally which specifically addressed this issue.

THE COURT: I'm not sure I'm saying anything to challenge that, I think what I'm saying though, the request as framed doesn't strike me as patently unreasonable, and one response could be we've already responded to this satisfactorially, we've already given you things that we think are proportional, and another could be we're not

going to give you anything at all, and I was just trying to understand what Liberty Mutual was with respect to the request as framed, that's all.

MR. LIAZOS: The request as framed in this motion to compel is exceedingly broad. Discovery has been provided with respect to this topic over a number of years, and, you know, frankly, it's four plus years later, and now they're changing their theory of the case and wanting to broaden out these requests to try to introduce a new claim, which Judge Saylor has noted, and that's Liberty Mutual's position on that matter.

answered my question, which was a request to know what was -- what was said to people around the time of the merger, so documents that would bear on that, whether that strikes you as a reasonable request in the context of a claim like this or unreasonable such that you would be posting an objection. I do understand that you've said there was a pamphlet that everybody got, and I do understand there's been litigation surrounding other parts of this case that, you know, and that maybe you have a right that they're still waiting to define really what the scope of this claim is, I was just kind of trying to get an idea is there something to fight over here?

Are there still documents out there that were

generated around the time of the merger leading up to the merger speaking to this issue of contributions, cautionary, and contributions that might have helped one to understand what Liberty Mutual was conveying to people around the time and, again, in a vacuum, it doesn't strike me as that unreasonable of a request.

MR. LIAZOS: I understand, your Honor, and I understand in a vacuum how one could see how that could relate to a fraud claim that was a misrepresentation.

To be perfectly candid, your Honor, I'm a last minute substitute here. I've been following this case for four years, and I'm not going to make a representation as to the scope of exactly what was given, so I need to go and look back in fairness, your Honor, but what I can tell you very specifically is that what was filed for the motion to compel, I mean, it's just unfair for us to answer that question given how exceedingly broad it was and how it did relate to a prior discovery request.

Now, for the first time, your Honor, Ms. Ball is saying, okay it relates to this request for production.

Well, that wasn't in the motion, it wasn't saying how we didn't comply, so I'm a little -- it's a little difficult to answer that.

THE COURT: What I try to do in a situation like these is have everybody roll up their sleeves and let's

just work through these because in some of this, as I was reading through, Ms. Ball, it was hard for me to agree that you should be entitled to everything that you were looking for, but there were some parts of it where I said, okay, if it's the only claim that's left is this breach of fiduciary duty claim, let's try to focus on that and let's try to understand what the claim is and let's try to figure out whether the meaningful discovery on this has been produced or whether there are still some corners we can look into, and that's what I'm trying to do.

Now, and I'm trying to sort of over the course of an hour to go through these with you guys to see if we can get some consensus. After that, I think you guys are going to have to hope we do our best looking at the papers to make our own judgment calls. We think it's always better if we can do it with the papers, so that's why, Mr. Liazos, I was sort of pressing you on this. I'm trying to be transparent.

If what we've got is basically a misrepresentation claim that played out in slow motion over the course of a number of years, documents, things that might have been said at the beginning I do think probably on paper are germane. I'll tell you where I have an issue, Ms. Ball, is saying over the years pretty much anything and everything that may have happened in the company we need to be able to

look at. That I have a hard time endorsing.

I also worry about this proportionality in terms of requiring Liberty Mutual just to go through years of records just to see if there might be something bearing on this. It's really what may have been said at a key moment in the past versus then when it came time for Mr. Turner to realize the benefits of the plan and then to learn what shortcomings there were, those are the moments, and, as I understand it, you probably already have stuff at the latter end. You probably understand, right, so we're really focusing more at the beginning end.

I'd look at RFP 69, and I'd say, okay, I might be inclined to endorse something like that, but I'd be limiting it to things for a finite time period, so I want to bog it down, but, Ms. Ball, let me go back to you and let's really try to go through this.

You tell me something specific that you're looking for, sort of a categorical fashion, and let's deal with it, all right?

MS. BALL: Sure. I'm going to go back to the first time we were here with you. We were asking about attorney-client communications that hadn't appeared. There was no indication of them on the privilege log prior to 2019.

When we talked then, your concern, which I

understand was that there wasn't enough specificity about what those things might be. Following that meet and confer, we did a deposition of Liberty Mutual's 30(b)(6), and in that deposition, we asked questions about changes, modifications, clarifications that take place on the SPDs, how those work, and she confirmed to us at that time that any time there's sort of clarification made for clarity or amendments, changes, modifications, they're discussed in a committee, then they are sent to in-house counsel, and those are reviewed.

Basically what we got at that time was clarification, yeah, any time, any time something like this happens, it's reviewed by an attorney.

THE COURT: Uh-hum.

MS. BALL: I think based on your prior ruling then, those are the clarifications made for the benefits of the beneficiaries. That's not protected by the attorney-client privilege. I understand, again, this is a long period of time we're talking about, but if there were clarifications made to the language related to the Safeco employees and cost sharing over the course of time, that's what we're looking for, communications and documents related to -- any communications with the attorneys based on those things. Is that clear?

THE COURT: I guess I don't -- the attorney aspect

of it -- I guess I don't understand conceptually why they would have -- why an attorney being involved would make them more or less discoverable, that really only to the extent we have an issue about whether they're privileged and shielded from disclosure, but it seems to me really what you would want, put aside who was involved in the chain would be decision-making by Liberty Mutual bearing on changes to this benefit, this really small component, no matter who was involved, and then the question would be one of proportionality.

If we're talking about a several-year period, I don't know why we would want to -- I don't know whether it would be fair to force Liberty Mutual to go through years and years and years of records to find communications that may have been somewhat innocuous but talked about this benefit when you have what Mr. Turner was told and then you have at the other end what they said at the end when they said no, you're not getting this benefit.

It may be helpful for you to understand how they got to that point. I don't know how critical it is for proving your claim, and, again, the concern is not so much one of relevance but a little bit of relevance, but it's about proportionality.

I think the burden here on Liberty Mutual -- I have no idea how the records are kept, I have no idea how

one would go about searching this stuff. We're talking about a big company over a several year period. Many people could have been involved in those sorts of communications, and I just don't know that it would be fair to force them to do that sort of search, again, for records where it's not clear to me that they're going to be that germane in this lawsuit.

MS. BALL: Well, your order on the previous motion to compel sort of shed some light on why this is important. You said in that one, "Internal communications about the details and scope of the benefits are relevant insofar as they may demonstrate that the defendant's understanding of the then existing benefits was consistent or inconsistent with what they communicated to the plaintiff."

THE COURT: Yes, sure, but as creatures of common sense, we can put some real reasonable strict time limits on this where I can say let's focus on the year or two around the merger when this would have been a hot topic, and then let's focus on the year or two leading up to Mr. Turner's retirement where we all know he was making a lot of noise about wanting to know about the details, and it's my sense from the prior hearing we had, there was a general understanding that he prompted Liberty Mutual to kind of go back and look at some of this stuff.

I don't know that you've made the case for several

years between, so say circa 2010/11 to in 2017, I don't know what we might see in there that's really going to be that critical or helpful.

MS. BALL: There were specific years where there were bigger changes made to the language in the policy. I don't know what those years are right now, but maybe what I would suggest then maybe we can narrow the scope of this request by saying these years, can you look for these documents for these specific years?

THE COURT: Well, what years, that's the question, but as part of that I guess I'd also want to know, do you already have other stuff that kind of helps you understand this, so, for example, my understanding is you've got all the summary plans for each year. Those plans, correct me if I'm wrong, would speak to the contours of this component, of this cost-sharing benefit.

If you've got that for the years, it really represents I guess that the results of any internal communications about what we should do, how we should behave because if it all gets reflected in an SPD and you got the SPD, why should you be getting anything more?

MS. BALL: Because, as Ms. McDermott explained to us, any sort of changes are made in response to plan beneficiaries inquiries when they sort of start to see like negatives, some confusion here, so what we're looking for

in these years that the changes were made was it because they knew that there were Safeco employees in their eyes were misunderstanding, in your eyes were perfectly understanding but then they adjusted the language to change what it allowed.

So she said like, for example, and I think we have this maybe for one of the later SPDs, they red lined the documents, they make notes in the margins to talk about maybe why they should be changing this stuff.

Getting that for the years where there were significant adjustments may shed light what defendant's understanding was of what Mr. Turner and these other Safeco beneficiaries understanding was the plan.

THE COURT: What were the years where there were significant adjustments?

MS. BALL: Your Honor, I don't want to speak out of turn here. I don't know for certain. I believe there was a pretty significant change in 2014, but I just don't know what the other years were. It wasn't -- I'm not going to come back and say, okay, I narrowed it down between 2008 and 2018, it's all years except for 2016, it's not that. There may be three or four years that would be particularly relevant.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know, I think I have to go back and reflect because obviously if there was

something out there, I'm making stuff up, there was a true really pertinent piece of communication where you've got people saying oh, my God, this is going to really affect our bottom line if we continue to provide this benefit, we need to change this, and even though we've told people differently this is how we're going to do it.

Everyone can imagine why that would be something you might want that you would be entitled to, but if, on the other hand, you have a situation where the plaintiff has no idea what communications may be out there and just says I'd like to see, I want to go fishing, who knows what I'm going to find, we could agree, no, that's not what discovery is about, that's not proportional, that's probably unduly burdensome.

I don't know where this one falls, but I have concerns that it falls closer to that than it does of plaintiff having a basis to really fear there's likely to be something that's very germane there, and it doesn't help your argument to understand you've already been provided with the plans themselves throughout the years so you can sit there and actually chart just by comparing them what changes were made and where I've already signaled, I'll go back and look at RFP 69, and probably to the extent Liberty Mutual hasn't already done so where I'm likely to say if there are communications that were made around the time of

the merger that reflects the thinking that went into the first plan or the plan that would have been provided around that time to provide that subject, of course, to privilege or anything like that.

And if you already acknowledged you got discovery that bears on what happened in the end with Mr. Turner ultimately retired, I don't know that in the context of this case given the claim you've got that it would be warranted to force Liberty Mutual to do too much more, but I will continue to reflect on that.

And as far as again, as far as the lawyer communications, the letters and everything go, I don't think it's so much that it's lawyer, you know, communications between lawyers that's really the issue or lawyers were involved, it's more the subject matter whether as it relates to your misrepresentation claim communications that might bear on that, and then if the lawyers were involved and there were any issues of privilege that we need to talk about or litigate, we could do it that way.

Maybe what makes sense, unless Liberty Mutual wants to be heard on this some more, we just go back on our end now and try to strike a balance.

MR. LIAZOS: So, your Honor, respectfully we would like to be heard on this issue. I would like to go back to

your prior question because I've had a chance to confer with my colleague, Mr. Diggs, and just go through the back and forth emails with plaintiff's counsel, I think a little perspective here in terms of what happened after March 15th will be helpful at least from the Liberty Mutual perspective kind of understand what's really going on here.

You know, it's been long known that the last day of discovery was March 15th, and after a second deposition of our 30(b)(6) witness, who is the head of Liberty Mutual entire benefits group, we then hear over a week later, that oh, we think we need to get into new matters, and then we had a conference with Judge Saylor on the 28th of March where he listened to this and said, okay, you guys work it out, I'm paraphrasing it, figure it out, file a joint statement and figure out where to go, and so at that point in time there was back and forth on RFPs.

Now, none of this, of course, is in any of the motion to compel that was filed by plaintiff. What's filed by plaintiff in that May 1st motion to compel bears no resemblance to any communications with Liberty Mutual before that joint entertainment was filed, and so I'm going to read from a letter that was written to plaintiff's counsel after that joint filing with respect to specific requests for production of documents, not this May 1st filing that is just broad beyond any conception.

So Request Number 69, "All documents related to the merger between Liberty Mutual Company and Safeco which provide or relate to treatment, years of service for purposes of eligibility, participation, vesting of any form of benefit accrual or general benefits under the ERISA benefit plan, including the retirement plan or health plan."

Response: "Liberty Mutual has already provided documents responsive to this request as part of an earlier discovery subject to Liberty Mutual's supplemental responses and objections to plaintiff's request for the production of documents dated October 19th, 2023 because Liberty Mutual has already provided documents in response to this RFP that are properly within the scope of discovery following the court's prior summary judgment rulings and because discovery is now closed, Liberty will not produce those documents."

Now, again, this particular matter, again, is not raised in the May 1st motion to compel, and we would submit, your Honor, that this motion to compel is directly related to the class action certification. They introduced an entirely new claim that wasn't in the complaint. In that regard, it's not a coincidence that they filed their motion to compel on the same day that they filed class action certification, and so all of these matters to which

we had some back and forth with after the March 28th meeting with Judge Saylor, none of that is in the motion to compel.

THE COURT: All right. I guess I just want to make sure I understand this. None of what Ms. Bell and I have been talking about is in the motion to compel? RFP 69 is not invoked in the motion to compel?

MR. LIAZOS: I'm saying that what the local rules requires, as you well know, your Honor, is really to get that specific discovery requests. The correspondence back and forth between the plaintiffs and defense counsel focused on the specific RFP.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. LIAZOS: Now we get a motion to compel, we're here now sitting --

THE COURT: You're saying that was not raised with you as a subject of disagreement where it might be reduced to a motion to compel?

MR. LIAZOS: The motion to compel was a shock to us when we saw the scope of it, the fact that we had back and forth regarding specific RFPs and we gave responses on many different RFPs.

THE COURT: So I'm not here to challenge that. I think I could probably tweak both sides when it comes to that, but we routinely in the motions we get often the

complaint from an opposing party that this wasn't really raised with them in a way that they simply understood, and I'm sympathetic to that, and that can be an issue in large part because sometimes they would say, gee, had we known this, we could have really made this a nonissue because either we've already provided this information or we could explain to you why we don't think it's relevant, we could have worked something out.

We're here now and I'm just trying to be really constructive and try to make this as much as a nonissue as I can. When you were telling me your response though, Mr. Liazos, to RFP 69, I'd like you to go back and read that again. There was one part that seemed to be saying --

MR. DIGGS: Sure.

THE COURT: There was one part where you seemed to be saying we've already responded, we've already given you stuff, but then it kind of ended with, and then for these reasons, I'm not going to give you anything.

So I guess I'm still trying to understand on this what, when Liberty Mutual responded and Liberty Mutual produced materials in response to this request to the extent, you know, what spiritually was it seeking to provide? You may, say yeah, we weren't going through all the depth as the way it's framed, but here's what we provided. You talked about a pamphlet at the beginning,

but I'd like to think maybe there was more than a pamphlet that was given.

MR. LIAZOS: Your Honor, there were documents, certainly, for example, the plan document. We also provided, which isn't really directly relevant, we provided the retirement plan document because plaintiffs believed that something in that pension plan that was drafted related to this particular matter, so I can't give you all the documents off the top of my head, but we did provide documents, and I just wanted to have it in the record that this was the response given to plaintiff's counsel on April 12th.

Instead of filing a motion to address this and have a constructive conversation today, we just have this, need everything, and the other point I wanted to make very, very quickly is this whole attorney-client issue, we really don't understand because the only claim that's left in the case is the (a)(3) claim. So how is it that when we're thinking about, when Liberty Mutual is considering changes to a plan that that is going to be relevant when nothing is being communicated?

THE COURT: Well, as I just indicated, right, I sort of agree with you on that. I don't really think that was the issue, what you said to me is the issue whether there's relevant information that is out there. If it

turns out that a lawyer is involved on the distribution list or in sending it, then maybe it creates an issue that we need to talk through of privilege, but that's really more of a side issue, and it's only if in the course of coming up with discoverable information, we see a lawyer was involved may have, so I really don't think that was the issue.

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But, again, when you responded, when Liberty

Mutual responded to RFP 69, did it say in its response we
refer you to documents, Bates stamped numbered X through X
so that we all can see for prosperity what was given in
response to this request?

MR. LIAZOS: I will look for that information. I do not know that answer off the top of my head.

THE COURT: Ms. Bell is shaking her head no, and what I'm trying to get at there, again, what I would be inclined to do to deal with this whole subject matter would be to say information around the time of the merger that would reflect conversations regarding this particular component that's left, the contribution sharing piece, I think if it can be rooted out without a Herculean effort is discoverable.

I'm not inclined to then say that the medieval period from post merger to retirement is one where Liberty Mutual I'm going to force them now to go through that,

although common sense tells us if there really was a particular significant event where everybody kind of agrees there was a conference regarding how to address this component or something, that would be different, but in the absence of people knowing of any of this, particularly at this juncture, I don't think in light of the claim, as I understand it, I would impose that requirement, and then, and again, the RFPs have already been provided, so it allows one to go through at moments just to see how particular aspects of the plan were being articulated and, then we've got discovery that I understand through the plaintiff was provided around, reflecting the time period that Mr. Turner when he left Liberty Mutual.

So that's how I'm likely to deal with that, and it would thus include, that would include if there were communications, internal communications where lawyers happened to be on it, and then if we have to deal with that issue, we deal with that issue.

Again, to me the issue is the content here rather than who was involved, so that's how I'm likely to deal with that, all right?

Given that, Ms. Bell, what else in our time would you like to talk about?

MS. BALL: Well, you know, part of the reason why we end up in this situation because Liberty has sort of

limited our discovery over and over again, only 2019, only this, only this, that's why we're still here, that's why we're still doing this in 2024 when the case was filed in 2020.

The other issue is the vast majority of their discovery responses don't make clear whether they've produced all documents or not, they sort of cherry pick, they answer on the merger document, hey, we gave you this pamphlet. Cool, but what we don't know is are there other things, too? So I mean if it's a matter of them saying, listen, we've already given all this stuff, okay, then supplement your responses and let us know that so we can stop arguing about this.

THE COURT: Yeah, I mean, I think what I would try to do to make this easiest for people is we would go through and we would issue some broad rulings on this, for example, I'll go back and I'll look at RFP 69. I'll tell you the way it read, it needs to be trimmed.

MS. BALL: Sure.

THE COURT: But I would then say all, you know, bearing on that, so to the extent that Liberty Mutual would need to supplement and would need do supplement its response to indicate whether there is anything additional or not anything additional to offer, they should do that.

We can do that on our end with a little bit of

wordsmithing, so I get that, but substantively, Ms. Bell, with respect to things, discovery that you are looking for, is there -- are there other things that you want to raise beyond what we've just talked about?

MS. BALL: Your Honor, I understand your Honor's concerns about the scope, and I don't want to be moan the issue too much, but I would just say the issue in this case is about representations made to these retirees over the course of a decade, what Liberty Mutual understood that they believed and what they did in summons to that, so changes made over the course and their consideration of those changes are relevant to whether there were misrepresentations, whether they knew that there was a misunderstanding, if that's what it was, and what they did in response to that.

Is it a long period of time? It is, but it's a long period of time under the plaintiff's allegations that they were misled about what happened.

THE COURT: I think the way I respond to that is to say I don't have to decide today whether I agree or disagree with that characterization of the scope of the claim. That would be for Judge Saylor.

MS. BALL: Yes.

THE COURT: For discovery purposes, I do tend to be -- I do tend to take a more liberal broader approach, so

to the extent it's arguable, I would tend to support a plaintiff's characterization of a more liberal read of the claim, but even then for proportionality concerns come into play, and I would be very concerned about whether it would be disproportionate to require Liberty Mutual to do more for that middle period where we don't necessarily know of anything specific, where the complaint doesn't explicitly carve out that period as being a time, where representations were made, and where everybody disagrees about the plans themselves for all those years, whatever plans were produced or provided have been proposed, so to an extent the inquiry that you would want to make is probably one that you can already begin to make.

Now, I'm not you encouraging you to do this, but
I'm just musing because I think we are now too far down the
road, but I'm musing. It might have been a different
scenario if what you had done was to say I have examined
all of the STPs and I have charted changes along the way
that appear to show that Liberty Mutual understood it would
not have been advantageous or it would be too expensive to
honor this benefit, and, therefore, appears to signal
deliberate changes over the years culminating in what
happened and what was issued around the time of
Mr. Turner's retirement, but we don't have that on this
record, and, therefore, I don't think I can endorse what

you are asking me to endorse absent something more definitive and concrete like that.

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So, again, I want to be fair to both sides. also do understand this is the claim that is left. I want to avoid a situation, same for Liberty Mutual's edification as well, I want to avoid a situation where at the end of this whole process you guys find yourself in front of Judge Saylor maybe thinking about additional litigation, like a trial, and it comes to pass that there really is critical information that should have been discovered but Cabell was just acting too conservatively and didn't permit it to happen, that's why there is a part of me that finds it defensible to try to indulge to a degree some of what the plaintiff is seeking but that, Ms. Bell, I'm telling you I'm trying to find that mid-point in light of the prior litigation and knowing that this case really has been trimmed severely and knowing at the moment it is not a class action case, it is just a case involving Mr. Turner.

MS. BALL: I'll say this one final thing unless you have other questions. It's a long period of time but it's 10 SPDs and not all of those 10 even made changes to the Safeco benefits. That already significantly limits what they would be looking for. It's maybe four SPDs that they would have to look and see, do we have notes on these changes, communications regarding clarifications that were

made on them. It's a long period of time. I don't think

it's that many documents that they would need to look

through.

I will look, all right. I guess I'm curious whether there's been any other discovery that would have asked Liberty Mutual to share internal thinking on this component other than what you're now asking the Court to do. That is through depositions, for example, through requests for admission, through other interrogatories, has this been explored?

MS. BALL: Yes. I think it's probably been explored to death.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. BALL: But if you want a specific, and part of the reason I keep bringing up the attorney-client privilege issue that is already a part of their objections to these, so I get sensitive about that and relate back to it, but if you want specific requests, Interrogatory Number 18 and RFP Number 74, which are the two most recently produced requests are directly on this issue. And those were, they were exhibits to our motion.

THE COURT: And I'm not sure how that cuts.

There's an argument that cuts for you, there's an argument that cuts against you.

1 MS. BALL: Sure.

THE COURT: Because you had opportunities, and you had, in fact, explored it, as you say, to death. There's a question as to -- and, again, it would be different if all of a sudden it was like, hey, you just learned there was a multi-year period where there may have been discussions and we know nothing about them, but that's not the case here. You have known about them and you asked about them, you know, through other interrogatories and requests for documents, so, again --

MS. BALL: And defendant has refused to produce the information over and over and over again, which is why we're here again. We touched on it a little bit in our previous motion to compel. We've gotten more information to sort of confirm that these discussions took place so we could be a little more specific about information we don't have, and, so, yes, when I've said we've done it to death, we've asked a thousand times. For years, we weren't allowed to ask for anything before 2019 now we're here and we've been fighting about it since the scope of discovery opened up late last year.

THE COURT: I understand the point you're raising, but, again, I think this is really an issue of proportionality, and you say it might only be three or four years, but, nonetheless, for any year if one has to do a

search like, I mean, I don't know how you go about doing it, but I can imagine it's not as simple as pressing a button or putting some search terms into a single database, so I need to give some thought to that, right?

Mr. Liazos, I can't tell whether you've been chafing at the bit to say something or you're just sitting there.

MR. LIAZOS: I'm trying to be respectful and listen. I understand the angst you have. You certainly don't want to have a situation where there should have been production and later on there's a problem.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. LIAZOS: And, you know, if we were in 2022 or 2023, I would have a lot more understanding of where you're at. This isn't a new claim that they've added. This claim has been there since the beginning of the case, and your Honor --

THE COURT: I'll tell you here's my worst concern.

I appreciate your words. Let me just tell you my worst nightmare, Mr. Liazos. Case proceeds further down the path. At a certain point, you're in front of Judge Saylor on something, and then it comes to light Liberty Mutual says, well, there was that time in 2015 when we all got together and said we really need to change this plan, boy, the participants aren't going to like it, but we'll save a

lot of money if we eliminate our obligation to make contributions, and then you say, well, Cabell did not make us, he did not force us to do a search that would have captioned communications like that. That would be my worst nightmare because technically you would be right but spiritually you couldn't be more wrong.

My reason for not requiring Liberty Mutual to do it in the year 2024, yeah, it's partly for the reasons you say, but it's partly because it seems to me that the plaintiff has already been provided with some information over those years. Plaintiff is likely to get you to maybe have you provide a more fulsome response for the time around the merger. Plaintiff has already been given stuff for about around the time Mr. Turner retired, and so at this juncture it doesn't seem warranted to force Liberty Mutual to do more.

But that doesn't mean Liberty Mutual should not independently reduce discovery bearing on this if it knows of it during this time period and knows that it might tend to help somebody to understand the evolution of their thinking as to how to treat this particular benefit, okay?

MR. LIAZOS: Understood, your Honor, I would just say that frankly we've had many communications over discovery, over very specific items, and I think it would be appropriate to give context to this Court the back and

forth communications between plaintiffs and defendants by very specific narrow issues and have a constructive dial-in on this and, frankly, the motion to compel just bears zero relationship to that, and so our frustration, your Honor, is we're sitting here four years after litigation, hundreds of thousands of dollars have been spent on discovery, and the idea of having to go back and do more discovery with a claim that's been there from the beginning, frankly, your Honor, our read of it is very clear.

They basically tried to put another claim in for cross-action certification, couldn't get it done, and now this is another fishing expedition to try to find out something else because the only claim that's left in the case has to do with representations, and there's not any representations they pointed to nowhere that shows that a representation was made to a broad group of people, and we've already provided 80 recordings of calls Mr. Turner made to the call center, so that's the frustration, your Honor.

THE COURT: Understood. Understood. I appreciate from both sides where people are coming from, and if there was a way I could so surgically and so clearly craft something that basically said something that really bears on Mr. Turner or conversations about benefits that would impact him given his status as a former Safeco person who

then came at the time he became retired, at the time he retired such that we really could just in a micro sort of way focus on limited types of communications that could bear benefit to him, I would do that, but I don't think I could do that. I don't think it's possible to do that, and, again, I'm not going to go back and now reopen all of this up, and that's where I'm just trying to listen to both sides, and I think we can come up with something that strikes a balance, all right?

MR. LIAZOS: Let me represent to the Court, this much I can tell you, I've been Liberty Mutual's counsel for over 20 years, and I'm familiar with their benefit plans. I mean, we produced everything that goes to the evolution of the thought process when it comes to this. If a representation needs to be done along those lines, we certainly can provide it.

THE COURT: I appreciate that, and I think it wouldn't be a bad idea to include that in any supplemental response you might want to provide to counsel for the plaintiff in that, but I appreciate hearing it from you in the context of this motion.

MR. LIAZOS: (Indiscernible) after the March 28th conference with Judge Saylor because plaintiff made reference to the proposed, you know, the proposal on April 5th, but there's no discussion of that anywhere, and

I think it would be very helpful to the Court to see the back and forth of what Liberty Mutual was willing to do and what plaintiffs decided to do in response to just completely ignore it and open up the scope of discovery to support a claim frankly that Judge Saylor said does not, is not appropriate.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. So just so you guys know what to expect to see, I don't think this is the sort of issue that lends itself well to like a 30-page opinion talking about the fundamentals of discovery and the like, so what I'm likely to do when we go back and digest this, we're going to come up with something that will basically say there's this motion to compel that's pending, it's been fully briefed, we had a hearing on X date, and based on arguments that were raised in the parties paper, based on the information that was adduced at the hearing, the Court rules as follows, and, you know, thus will be the rulings without a whole lot of explanation.

So I just want you to be, you know, to understand that's how I'm likely to treat this because I want to deal with this sooner rather than later, and I don't want to have to spend a lot of time doing stuff and writing things that you guys already understand, okay?

Let me ask you assuming this issue gets resolved,

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      are we done with discovery, and then what's the next major
      event in this case?
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               MS. BALL: Motions for summary judgment.
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               THE COURT: I want to be clear, it's really -- tee
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      it back up for dispositive motions and thing like that.
      All right. All the more we will try to deal with this
      sooner rather than later, all right? Thank you, everybody.
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      This has been very helpful.
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               MS. BALL: Thank you so much for your time.
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               MR. LIAZOS: All right. We'll be in recess.
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               (Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 2:53 p.m.)
12
                           CERTIFICATE
13
      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT )
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      DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS ) ss.
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      CITY OF BOSTON )
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                I do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript,
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      Pages 1 through 45 inclusive, was recorded by me
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      stenographically at the time and place aforesaid in Civil
19
      Action No. 20-11530-FDS, THOMAS TURNER, et al. vs. LIBERTY
20
      MUTUAL RETIREMENT BENEFIT PLAN, et al., and thereafter by me
21
      reduced to typewriting and is a true and accurate record of the
22
      proceedings.
23
                Dated November 7, 2024.
24
                              s/s Valerie A. O'Hara
                               VALERIE A. O'HARA
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